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I.  INTRODUCTION
1.  Training  for  vocationally-specific  skills,  as  distinguished  from
general  education,  is  undertakon  in formal  and  nonformal  modes in
industrializ4d  and  developing  countries. This  training,  referred  to as
vocational  education  and  training  (VET),  encompasses  a broad  range  of
skills  covering  theoretical  and  cognitive  development  in  the applied
sciences  to narrow  training  that  is specific  to individual  occupations. In
formal  modes,  VET is  offered  in secondary  and  postsecondary  education
institutions  with vocational  and  technical  curricula. In  nonformal  modes,
VET is  provided  by vocational  training  centers  run  by  ministries  of labor,
social  affairs,  and  various  technical  ministries  and  by emp&. X
associations  and  enterprises.  Other  nonformal  modes  of  VET - 4d
apprenticeships,  on-the-job  training,  and  training  provided  by equipment
suppliers. VET  plays  an important  role  in  meeting  skill  needs  for  economic
development.  World  Bank  education  sector  lending  in developing  countries
totalled  $7.4  billion  between  1963  and  1986,  with $3.9  billion  of this
total  invested  in  training  for  vocationally-specific  skills  (Schwartz,
1988).
2.  As a source  of productive  skills  acquisition,  formal  modes  of  VET
have  attracted  considerable  attention  with criticisms  of their  high cost
and  frequent  failure  to achieve  training  goals.  (Adams,  1980;  Borus,  1977;
Dougherty,  1987;  Grasso  and  Shea,  1981;  Psacharopoulos,  1986) This
attention  has resulted  in  efforts  to reduce  the  cost  of skills  development
in these  modes,  while  attempting  to  maintain  satisfactory  levels  of
effectiveness,  and  in  other  cases,  efforts  to increase  their  effectiveness,
while  maintaining  or even  reducing  their  cost. Alongside  these  efforts
1related  to efficiency  in  the  production  of VET,  other  steps  have  been  taken
which  would  make formal  modes  of VET  more responsive  to  market  forces  in
determining  which  skills  are  produced  and  in  what quantities.  These
efforts  are  summarized  respectively  as improving  the  internal  and  external
efficiency  of VET.  Reflecting  this  attention,  the  share  of VET  in  World
Bank-assisted  investments  in formal  modes  has  steadily  decreased  over  the
past two  decades  with a  larger  share  of investment  in  nonformal  modes  of
training.
3.  The  efforts  taken  to improve  formal  modes  of VET  havo  frequently
focused  on matters  of policy  within  the  control  of schools  and  the
education  sector. Some  examples  include  efforts  to improve  teacher
education  and  administration,  upgrade  training  facilities  and  equipment,
update  programs  and  curricula,  and  refine  admission  and  certification
standards. Less attention  has  been  given  to the  economic  environment  and
the  array  of economic  policies  outside  the  education  sector  that  can  alter
the  derived  demand  for  skilled  labor  and influence  individual  and  social
returns  to investments  in  VET.  These  policies  are  identified  by Balassa
(1987)  as ones  which  can  distort  the  operation  of product  and  factor
markets. In factor  markets,  this  includes  social  policies,  financial
policies,  and  tax  policies  affecting  the  relative  price  of labor  and
capital,  while in  product  markets,  it includes  trade  policies  (import
protections and export subsidies), exchange rate polici2as,  and price
controls  all  of which  affect  relative  product  prices.
4.  This  paper  explores  the  manner  in  which  economic  policies  can  act
to  thwart  or discourage  efforts  within  the  education  sector  to improve  the
internal  and  external  efficiency  of  VET.  The  study  is  part of a broader
2policy  study  of training  for  vocationally-specific  skills  in developing
countries  conducted  by the  World  Bank. The  objective  of the  broader  study
is to  provide  guidance  to educational  policy  makers  in  developing  countries
and  to Bank  staff  in  the s*electiGa,  design  and  development  of appropriate
training  models. The  present  paper  contributes  to this  objective  by
exploring  the linkage  between  broad  economic  policies  and  the  development
of skilled  manpower  for  economic  and  social  development.  A better
understanding  of this linkage  is important  to those  concerned  with the
selection  of appropriate  economic  development  strategies  as  well as those
responsible  for  the  development  of effective  training  programs.
5.  Benson  (1987)  offers  a taxonomy  identifying  conditions  mnder  which
formal  modes  of  VET are  expected  to  be an efficient  institutional  source  of
skills  acquisition. This  taxonomy  considers  the  capacity  of  these  modes
for  realizing  economies  of scale  in training,  the  complementary  linkages
with general  education,  and  the  ability  to focus  on social  alongside
private  interests  in  training. In addition,  while  many educational
planners  and  labor  market  analysts  have  come  to recognize  the  benefits  of
moving  training  closer  to the  enterprise  in  terms  of added  efficiency,  this
does  not  translate  directly  into  the  dismantling  of existing  VET  systems
(Squire,  1981,  p.204). The  large  investment  of  most industrialized  and
developing  countries  in formal  modes  of  VET suggests  instead  that less
costly  alternatives  will  be explored  to improve  linkages  between  schools
and  enterprises,  including  the  restructuring  of  VEr  financing  (Dougherty
and  Tan, 1988).
6.  Against  this  background,  tha  paper  begins  with4  a social  systems
model  to trace  the  impact  of the  economic  environment  and  policies  on the
3Internal  and  external  efficiency  of  VET.  It  continues  with a discussion  of
how specific  economic  policies  can  shape  efforts  to improve  the  nternal
and  external  efficiency  of VET.  Some  evidence  ot this  relationship  is
provided  in a  review  of the  VET experience  in seo'ected  countries. The
paper  concludes  with some  t.  3tive  lessons  for  VET lending  and  sector  work
as drawn  from  this  review  ano  offers  an agenda  for  the  further  study  and
validation  of the  economic  environment  thesis.
II.  A  SYSTEMS  MODEL  FOR SKILLS DEVELOPMENT
7.  Middleton  and  Schwartz  (1986)  employ  a  social  systems  approach  to
the  modeling  of skills  development  (also  sea  Middleton  and  Demaky,  1988,
pp.  7-9).  Their  heuristic  model  view  skills  development  as  a product  of
the  interaction  of  system  components  which  are  dynamically  connected  by
flows  of  information  and  resources.  The  modeling  of  these  components  and
connecting  flows  provides  a  framework  for  guiding  the  study  of  VET.  A
general  model  is  offered  in  Figure  1 which  depicts  external  economic  and
social  factors  (1.0)  as influencing  a society's  political  and  economic
system  (2.0). This  system  in  turn functions  through  policy  institutions
and  mechanisms  (7.0)  to affect  the  labor  force  (3.0)  and  the  training  (8.0)
and  employment  (5.0)  systems. The  model  includes  a  feedback  component  on
the  effectiveness  of skills  development  (16.0)  that  connects  the  employment
system  with a society's  policy  institutions  and  mechanisms. An expanded
version  of this  model is  offered  in  Figure  2  which  depicts  in greater
detail  the  connection  between  economic  policies  and  tha  skills  development
process. This  expanded  model  shows  the important  connecting  linkages
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Omd  kploymtbetweer  the  major  systems  cf the  model,  and  in  the  case  of the  training  and
employment  systems,  the  internal  components  of these  systems. Middleton
and  Schwartz  argue  that  these  linkages  are  particularly  important  and  that
their  absence  or  weakness  will lead  to the  system's  relative  inefficiency
(1986,  p.11). The  model  is generic. The  nature  of its  components  and
connecting  flows,  for  example,  is likely  to be  very different  when compared
across  distinctive  political  and  economic  systems. The  merits  of the  model
therefore  rest  in  the  structure  it  provides  for  the  analysis  of VET.  As
one  approaches  the  problem  of skills  development  in  a pasticular  setting,
the  model suggests  where  to begin  looking  for  the  key  elements  and
potential  points  for  policy  intervention.
8.  The  expanded  model  shows  how  the  political  and  economic  system  of a
society  (2.0),  as shaped  by external  economic  and  social  factors  (1.0),
functions  through  its  policy  institutions  and  mechanisms  (7.0)  to establish
basic  resource  and  policy  parameters  (9.0,  10.0)  for  training  (8.0)  and
employment  (5.0)  systems. Differences  in  these  basic  resources  and  policy
parameters  in  turn lead  to differences  among  training  and  employment
systems. The  training  and  employment  systems  are  each  comprised  of
dynamically-linked  sub-systems  which  define  their  efficiency  and
effectiveness. In  the  training  system,  for  example,  training  is comprised
of teachers,  students,  facilities  and  equipment  linked  through  a curriculum
to learning  activities.  In the  employment  system,  manpower  is joined  with
other  resources  and  technology  in  production  activities.  The  model
connects  the  training  and  employment  systems  in several  ways.  For  example,
the  product  of the  training  system,  skilled  persons  (12.0),  is used  by the
employment  system. Labor  markets  (13.0)  or employment  mechanisms  in  the
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The employment  system  sends  demand  signals  (14.0)  to the  training  system
and  to  the labor  force  (3.0). The  labor  force  also  receives  supply  signals
(15.0)  related  to training  spaces  from  the  training  system. The  model,  in
addition,  includes  institutional  linkages  (7.0)  between  the  training  and
employment  systems. These  linkages  may come  in  various  forms  ranging  from
advi2ory  committees  of employers  on training  curricula  to formal  contracts
for  training  services. The equilibrium  of the  skills  development  process
is  maintained  by the  feedback  mechanisms  on employment  (16.0),  which  are
used  to modify  policy,  and  by demand  and  supply  signals  (14.0,  15.0).
9.  The  connecting  linkages  between  the  three  systems  play  a  vital  role
in  the  efficiency  of skills  development.  The  internal  efficiency  of  VET,
for  example,  is  shaped  by institutional  policy  and  management  within  the
training  system  which  determines  how  a training  institution  uses inputs  of
information  and  resources  to produce  skilled  persons. As a consequence,
the  effectiveness  of institutional  policy  and  management  within  the
training  system  will depend  on  the  nature  of externally  determined  training
policies  and  resources  (9.0)  furnished  by the  political  and  economic  system
(2.0),  the  demand  signals  (14.0)  received,  and  the  institutional  linkages
(11.0)  provided. If  training  policies  are  unclear  or resources  inadequate,
if  demand  signals  are  weak or inaccurate,  or  if institutional  linkages  are
ineffective  or  absent,  the  internal  efficiency  of the  training  system  in
producing  skilled  persons  will  be tnreatened.  These  connecting  linkages
and  their  system  antecedents  can  therefore  play  an important  role  affecting
the internal  efficiency  of  VET.
810.  By the  same  token,  the  external  efficiency  of VET  will be
influenced  by  management  in  the employment  system  and  its  determination  of
how enterprises  will use  skilled  labor  and  other  resources  along  with
technology  in  production  activities.  The effectiveness  of  management  in
this  task  will  be controlled  by externally  determined  economic  policies  and
resources  (10.0),  non-governmental  resource  flows  (17.0),  supply  signals
received  through  the labor  market  (13.0),  and  the  institutional  linkages
with the  training  system  (11.0)  and  political  and  economic  system  (16.0).
These  components  and  connecting  flows  of the  model  together  with the
quality  of  management  will determine  the  extent  to  which  available  skills
are  put  to productive  use.  The  degree  to  wehich  skills  are  used
productively  will govern  the  external  efficiency  of  VET as  will the
effectiveness  of labor  markets  (13.0)  and  other  formal  and informal
linkages  between  production  and  training  (11.0,  16.0,  14.0)  in  signaling
relative  skills  scarcities  and  in guiding  the  orientation  and  design  of
training  systems.
11.  In  summary,  the  systems  model  for  skills  development  offered  by
Middleton  and  Schwartz  permits  one  to trace  the zLapact  of economic  policies
on  the internal  and  external  efficiency  of VET.  The  model  implies  that
resource  and  policy  parameters  are  established  by a political  and  economic
system  and  are  given  to managers  of employment  and  training  systems. The
efficiency  with  which  these  systems  perform  is in  turn  shaped  by these
parameters,  the  quality  of systems  management,  and  the institutional
linkages  and  information  flows  provided. The  economic  policies  (10.0)
included  in the  model  can oe  broadly  defined  and  embrace  the  policies
described  by B&Lassa  (1987)  as influencing  the  operation  of factor  and
9product  markets. These  policies  establish  resource  and  policy  parameters
as constraints  to the  actions  of employment  and  training  systems  managers.
As such,  these  policies  are  important  elements  in the  systems  model
influencing  the internal  and  external  efficiency  of  VET.
III. LINKING  ECONOMIC  POLICES  TO VET
12.  Economic  policies  in  the  environment  surrounding  the education
sector  can  play  an important  role  in  determining  the  internal  and  external
efficiency  of VET.  The  effect  of these  policies  can  be seen  in the  systems
model  through  their  influence  on factor  prices  and  technology  choices  in
the  employment  system  and  through  their  impact  on information  flows  between
the  employment  and  training  systems. As an illustration,  incomes  policies
that  weaken  or severe  the relation  between  wages  and  productivity  in  an
effort  to reduce  social  inequities  can  affect  both  the internal  and
external  efficiency  of VET. Wages  in  this  context  will no longer  provide
appropriate  market  signals  to the  labor  force  and  enterprises  regarding
social  rates  of return  to investments  in  skills  training  with the result
that  inefficiencies  may arise  in the  mix  of skills  and  the  manner  in  which
they  are  produ,ed.
13.  The  source  of these  inefficiencies  in  this  illustration  rests
outside  the  control  of the  education  sector  symbolizing  the  problem  faced
by this  sector  in its  efforts  to improve  VET.  It  must in this  and  other
cases  depend  on the feedback  components  of the  skills  development  system
for  change  and its  own  ability  to adjust  and  plan  for  these  constraints.
The constraints  imposed  by these  polices,  of course,  are  only  one element
10affecting  the  education  sector's  efforts  to improve  VET.  Others  include
the  effectiveness  of institutional  linkages  botween  the  employment  and
training  systems  and  the  quality  of  management  in the  employment  system.
Improving  the institutional  linkages  between  the  employment  and  training
systems  requires  the  cooperation  of  both  systems. The  training  system
cannot  address  this  problem  alone. Ineffective  management  in the
employment  system  can  also  lead  to technical  inefficiencies  and  a failure
to adopt  cost-minimizing  technologies  and  factor  combinations.
14.  This  example  can  be extended  to other  economic  policies  that impose
constraints  on tho  education  sector's  efforts  to improve  the  internal  and
external  efficiency  of VET. These  policies  are  organized  in terms  of their
impact  on factor  and  product  markets.
ECONOMIC  POLICIES  INVOLVING  FACTOR  MAPIMETS
The  Market  for  Labor
15.  Labor  market  policies  may  be adopted  that  intervene  in  the
operation  of  competitive  labor  markets  affecting  the  demand  for  VET.  For
example,  rather  than  wages  being  determined  simply  by  market  forces,  they
can  be determined  by public  policies  concerned  with broader  social  issues
related  to income  security  and  social  equality. Minimum  wages  are  en
illustration  of this as  used  by industrialized  and  developing  countries  to
provide  a  minimum  standard  of living  for  the  employed. The  impact  of these
policies  on employment  and  the  demand  for  VET is  explained  by Balassa:
... tho  narrowing  of  wage differences  (due  to  minimum
wages]  will discourage  socially  profitablo  investments  in
human  capital  as incentives  for  such investment  are
reduced. Also.  distortions  will  be introduced  in  the
choice  between  iabor  and  physical  capital,  between
unskilled  labor  and  skilled  labor,  as  well as between  labor
11in the  formal  sector  and  the  informal  sector,  where  minimum
wage  regulations  are  rarely  applied,  (1987,  p.12).
16.  Leighton  and  Mincer  (1979,  p. 159)  suggest  that  minimum  wages  may
discourage  enterprises  from  providing  vocationally-specific  skills  training
that  would  otherwise  be paid  for  by employees  through  reduced  wages.
Workers  are instead  forced  to  prolong  their  schooling  to acquire  these
skills. The authors  cite  this  as a reason  for  the *;rowth  of community
colleges  and  vocational  schools  in industrialized  countries  and  for  the
growing  demand  for  vocationalism  in  college  curricula. The result  of such
policies,  they  argue,  is  to shift  demand  for  vocationally-specific  skills
training  from  enterprises  to school-based  settings,  thereby  loosening  the
linkage  between  training  and  employment  systems  and  potentially  reducing
the  external  efficiency  of  VET.
17.  The impact  of these  policies  falls  heavily  on low-wage  workers.
Individuals  whose  productivity  is  below  the  minimum  may lose  their  jobs
while  those  whose  productivity  is  worth  at least  as  much or  more than  the
minimum  will lose  opportunities  for  skills  training  in  the  enterprise. For
individuals  with earnings  above  the  minimum,  the  enterprise  may  be  willing
to offer  training  paid ro-  with reduced  earnings,  but  the individual's
incentive  to acquire  this  training  will  be reduced  by the  compression  of
earnings  for  skilled  and  unskilled  workers. The impact  of minimum  wages  on
skills  development,  however,  depends  on the  aggressiveness  with  which  this
policy  is  pursued.  Fallon  and  Riveros  (1986,  p.14),  for  example,  point  out
that  minimum  wage policies  in  developing  countries  have  been  employed  less
aggressively  over time  and,  therefore,  are  now less  effective.
18.  In  developing  countries,  wage  compression  often  takes  place  in a
system  where  basic  wages  at each  skill  qualification  level  are  defined  as
12legal  minima. The  distorting  effect  of such  a system  in terms  of expected
private  returns  to the  acquisition  of additional  skills  is illustrated  in
Figure  3.  In  this  figure,  Wi is  the  market-determined  wage curve  which
would  prevail  in  the  absence  of  minimum  wage practices,  reflecting  relative
skills  scarcity  at  each level,  and  W2 is  the flattened  wage curve,
reflecting  social  objectives  of redistribution  and  protection  of lower
skilled  manpower. Thus,  in  the lower  skills  range,  which  in developing
countries  is  usually  in excess  supply,  social  protection  raises  the  actual
wage ab'-re  the  corresponding  shadow  wage level. This discourages  demand
for  this  type  of  manpower,  while,  at the  same  time,  the  reduced  slope  of  W2
discourages  individuals  from  acquiring  additional  skills  within  this range.
19.  While  the  system  legally  prohibits  employers  from  remunerating
workers  below  W2,  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  them from  paying  workers  more
than  the  legal  minima. With regard  to the  relatively  scarcer  higher  skill
levels,  therefore,  Wl will  prevail. The  result  is  a segmented  labor  market
with a truncated  wage curve. Below  or to the  left  of the  critical  skills
level  S,  which is identified  with  the  intersection  of Wl and  W2,  wages
reflect  the  legal  minima  and  above  this  level  they  are  competitive.  From
the  individual's  point  of  view,  thus,  skills  acquisition  is  profitable
beyond  S, but  much  less  so  below  the  critical  skills  level. The impact  of
this  segmentation  on the  cost-effectiveness  of existing  VET institutions
obviously  depends  on the level  and  characteristics  of S.  To the  extent  S
is  viewed  as  the  skills  point  separating  post-primary  VET delivery  modes
from  postsecondary  formal  education,  this  would  help  rationalize  the
prevailing  view in  many developing  countries  of  VET as  not  worth  pursuing.
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Figure  35 Competitive  and  Administered  Wages  by Skill  Level
1420.  Zimbabwe  provides  an *xample  of a  country  where  government  wage
regulation  policies,  including  minimum  wages,  have  distorted  training
incentives  (World  Bank,  1987,  Vol. II,  p.14). Minimum  wages  were adopted
by the  government  in 1980  following  independence  as part  of a  strategy  to
raise  the incomes  of  Africans  at the  bottom  of the  income  distribution.
Along  with this,  restrictions  on wage increases  were adopted  for  those  at
the  upper  end  of the income  distribution  to reduce  income  disparities  and
manage  inflation. The  government  also  adopted  job  security  laws
restricting  employers'  rights  to dismiss  employees  as an antidote  to the
empl -mont reduction  expected  with the  incroase  in  minimum  wages.  The
minimum  wage reached  its  maximum  in 1982,  coincident  with the  peaking  of
the  unemployment  rate  for  unskilled  youth. More direct  evidence  of the
impact  on training  is  suggested  by the  declining  number  of apprenticeships
offered  by the  private  sector,  2,044  in 1981  compared  with 1,197  in 1985.
21.  Administered  wage and  employment  policies  of  the  public  sector  in
many developing  countries  can  also  lead  to labor  market  distortions
affecting  the  efficiency  of  VET investments.  The  visibility  of these
policies  can  be a factor  in determining  their  effect,  particularly  as
related  to the level  of public  sector  employment. In a study  of 38
developing  countries,  Heller  and  Tait  show  that  employment  in the  public
sector  accounts  for  an average  of 44  percent  of nonagricultural  employment
(1983,  pp.7,  42-43,  also  see  Fallon  and  Riveros,  1987,  p.16).  The
distortions  arising  from  these  policies  emanate  from  the  level  of  earnings
paid  by the  public  sector  and  the  role  played  by it  as an employer  of last
resort. The impact  of  these  policies  on the  labor  market  is discussed  by
Psacharopoulos:
15..Wages  in the  public  sector  exceed  wages  in the
private  sector  at lower,  although  not  at higher  levels  of
education  in  Brazil,  Colombia,  Greece,  Malaysia,  and
Portugal. In  contributing  to  higher  wages  for  the  less-
educated  work2r,  public  sector  wage policies  tend  to
compress  the  wage distribution,  thereby  aggravating
distortions  in labor  markets. Also,  in  some  African
developing  countries  (e.g.  Mali and  Tanzania)  the
government  or the  parastatals  are  residual  employers  for
high  school  and/or  university  production,  thereby
introducing  distortions  as  between  private  and  social
returns  to education,  (quoted  in  Balassa,  p.16).
22.  In Indonesia,  government  wage  scales  for  persons  with  no schooling
and  those  with primary  and  secondary  schooling  ar-  from  2 to 20 times  the
monthly  income  of non-government  employees  (McMahon,  1986,  p. 288). This
wage differential  does  not  exist  at the  postsecondary  level. As a
consequence,  there  is  a long  queue  of  persons  with  a  secondary  diploma  or
less  in Indonesia  waiting  for  government  jobs.  These  individuals  wait for
an average  of two  years. A successful  wait by secondary  school  graduates
is estimated  to  yield  a  rate  of return  of over 25  percent.
23.  In Egypt,  the  government  guarantees  employment  to graduates  of
secondary  and  postsecondary  institutions.  Furthermore,  it  provides  'free"
education  to its  citizens  through  the  postsecondary  level. The  combination
of these  policies  has contributed  to an oversupply  of university  graduates
in  relation  to skilled  craftsmen  and  technicians  and  an overstaffing  and
underemployment  in  public  enterprises  and  government,  which in 1984
accounted  for  slightly  over  32  percent  of total  employment  (Haddad,
Stevenson,  and  Adams,  1987,  p.9).
24.  In  Zambia,  public  sector  wage  policies  have attempted  to narrow  the
real  wage gap  between  the  lowest  and  highest  paid  workers. Government
workers  in  the  highest  paid  occupations  in 1983  earned  in real  terms  45
percent  of their  1975  salaries  while  those  in the  lowest  paid  occupations
16earned  88 percent  of their  1975  salaries  (World  Bank,  1986,  pp.  58-59).
The  government  was less  successful  in imposing  wage restraints  on
parastatals  And  the  private  sector  although  some  wage compression  could  be
observed  in  each  sector.  This  compression  is  blamed  for  Zambia's  high
unemployment  and  serious  financial  disincentives  for  acquiring  skills.
25.  A World  Bank  study  of  the  Tunisian  economy  finds  wages  in  public
enterprises  exceeding  those  in  the  private  sector  (1985,  pp.  19-21).  The
study  also  offers  evidence  of  wage  compression  attributable  to labor  market
policies  and  administered  wage structures.  Noah  and  Middleton  (1987)  cite
evidence  of  wage compression  in  China. China's  recent  efforts  to
restructure  its  economy  have  introduced  changes  that  resemble  a competitive
market  economy. The  pace  of change  kas  been  slow,  however,  and  much  of the
old  system  remains,  including  a naticnally  determined  wage scale  with
meager  earnings  differentials  between  levels  of skills. The  authors  argue
that 'Combined  with  very slow  promotion,  this  compressed  wage structure
provides  few  financial  incentives  to  workers  to raise  their  levels  of
productivity  (p.4)."  This  limitation  of incentives  for  training  is
referred  to  as  one  of  the  important  underlying  causes  of China's  severe
shortage  of skilled  labor.
26.  Fallon  and  Riveros  (1986,  p. 23)  conclude  that  governments  have
generally  limited  rather  than  encouraged  real  wage increases  in recent
years  and  that  high  wage regimes  are  now  the  exception  rather  than  the
rule.  They  argue  instead  that  mandatory  government  regulations  on  labor
compensations  have come  to play  a  more important  role  in  wage rigidity
increasing  non-wage  costs. Included  in  these  costs  are  support  for  health
and  family  welfare,  as  well as  workers'  job  security  and  pension  schemes.
17These  costs  are  expected  to  lead  to  labor  market  distortions  with
implications  for  occupational  training  and  VET.  The  impact,  however,  is
uncertain. On thu  one  hand,  by increasing  labor9s  fixed  cost  they imply  a
social  welfare  loss  through  capital  substitution  and  lower  employment
levels.  On the  other  hand,  the  nature  of  these  regulations  may  be to
reduce  mobility  and  thereby  encourage  enterprise  investments  in specific
skills.  To the  extent  these  costs  are  positively  correlated  with
seniority,  however,  they  may encourag-  labor  turnover  and  lower  investment
in  specific  training.
27.  In Burundi,  the  social  overhead  cost  of labor  is estimated  between
30 and  50 percent  of the  wage  bill  covering  housing  allowances,  social
security,  medical  coverage,  and  payroll  taxes  (World  Bank,  1988,  pp.  53-
54).  Matched  with government  incentives  reducing  the  cost  of capital,  this
is  considered  an  important  fAotor  behind  the  slow  growth  of employment  in
Burundi's  modern  sector  compared  with  its  agriculture  and  informal  sectors
where  small  enterprises  are  frequently  able  to escape  labor  regulations.
Pakistan  which  has  adopted  a  system  of  labor  protection  laws  modelled  after
those  in  European  countries  provides  another  example  of  distortions  tied  to
these  regulations.  Enterprises  of  more  than  10  employees  are  subject  to
minimum wages,  health  and  safety  regulations,  overtime  payments,  and  social
security  taxes.  The  cost  of  these  regulations  is  seen  as  a  factor
encouraging  capital  intensive  development.  In  Portugal,  restrictive  labor
legislation  has  made  it  very  difficult  to  dismiss  workers  and  transfer  them
to  other  jobs.  This  legislation  along  with  rigid  pay  and  incentive  scales
have  discouraged  upgrading  and  retraining.
1828.  Labor  market  policies  leading  to admin  _-ered  wage structures  that
weaken  the  link  between  productivity  and  wages  can  be reinforced  by trade
union  policies  involving  work rules,  job  stratification,  and  wages. Ryan
(1984)  contends  that  trade  unions  seek  to limit  wage differentiation  for  at
least  two  reasons: ostensibly  to improve  equity  in  pay  among  workers;  but
more importantly,  to reinforce  the  union's  bargaining  power  for  experienced
workers  by increasing  the  relative  cost  of trainees. A similar  argument
has  been  made  to explain  trade  unions'  traditional  support  of minimum
wages.  In  competitive  labor  markets,  wages  are  an imnortant  measure  of
demand  providing  signals  to the  labor  force  and  training  system. Thus,  the
adoption  of labor  narket  policies  and  practices  that  result  in administered
wage structures  threatens  to distort  these  signals  by creating  a  wedge
between  private  and  social  returns  for  VET.  This  wedge  can  also  be  opened
by tax  policies  that  lcad  to  a  divergence  of  before  and  after  tax  incomes.
29.  A workforce  confronted  with  a relatively  flat  wage  profile  will
find  a reduced  economic  incentive  for  investing  in skills  training,  or
perhaps  for  that  matter,  in general  education. Evidence  of this  is found
by Prais  and  Steedman  (1986)  in  their  study  of  vocational  training  in  the
construction  trades  in France  and  Britain. The authors  found  that  the
number  of youths  attaining  comparable  professional  qualifications  in  France
in the 1970's  was about  1.7  times  the  number  in  Britain  even  though  the
size  of the industry  was roughly  the  same  in  both  countries. They  argue
that  training  in  Britain  was discouraged  by relatively  high trainee  wages.
Second-year  trainees  in  Britain  earned  about  70  percent  of adult  craftsman
wages,  while  those  in  France  earned  about  25 percent  of an adult's  wages.
19Apprentice  wages in  Britsin  have  since  been revised,  but in 1984  were still
more than  double  the  French  percentage.
30.  The importance  of the  wage  profile  is further  illustrated  in  West
Germany  and  Tunisia. The  effectiveness  of the  highly  pu'olicized  West
German  'dual'  VET system  is largely  due  to the  fact  that it is  demand-
driven  and  is therefore  predicated  on an adequate  supply  of training  places
by enterprises.  Apprentice  wages,  which  average  between  20  to 40 percent
of the  starting  wage level,  play an important  role  in creating  this  supply
(Schwartz,  1986,  p.6).  By contrast,  in  Tunisia's  'official'  apprenticeship
system,  apprentices  are legally  entitled  upon reaching  18  years  of age  to
the  guaranteed  minimum  wage and  incorporation  in  the  social  security  system
which  adds  another  36  percent  to their  wage cost.  This  increase  in  wages
occurs  without  consideration  to  whether  the  training  has  been  completed  and
full  productivity  reached. As a  consequence,  the  supply  of training  places
in the  modern  sector  of Tunisia  is depressed  and  apprentices  are  often
fired  and  replaced  just  before  reaching  the  age  of 18 (World  Bank,  1985).
31.  It is interesting  in  this  context  to note  that  under  the
traditional  apprenticeship  systems  found  in  the  informal  sector  throughout
much of Sub-Saharan  Africa,  apprentices  are  not  only  unpaid,  they  are  often
expected  to pay  their  employer  for  the  training  they  receive. It is
therefore  important  to find  that  the informal  sector  in these  countries  is
much nore  dynamic  in  terms  of its  rate  of absorption  of youths  as  new  job
seekers  than is its  modern  sector  counterpart.  These  findings  and  others
above  suggest  several  hypotheses  about  the  impact  of labor  market  policies
on the  supply  and  demand  for  vocationally-specific  skills  training.
2032.  As proposed  by Balassa,  labor  market  policies  creating  administered
wage structures  may encourage  a shift  of employment  from  the  modern  sector
to the  informal  sector  where  these  policies  are  rarely  applied. By
increasing  the  relative  price  of unskilled  labor  through  wage compression,
these  policies  may also  result  in  the  modern  sector's  use  of labor-saving
technologies  and  capital  substitution.  Ia  other  cases,  they  may  contribute
to the  substitution  of skilled  for  unskilled  labor. Administered  wage
structures  and  ths  compression  of  wages  may also  discourage  nonformal  modes
of training  in  the  enrerprise.  The  enterprise,  unable  to pass  the  cost  of
training  on to  workers  in  the  form  of lower  wages,  may resist  investing  in
occupational  skills  that  can  be lost  through  labor  mobility,  the  more  so if
product  markets  are  also  subject  to administered  pricing  regimes  that
prevent  passing  the  cost  of training  on to consumers. In this  environment,
vocationally-specific  skills  training  is expected  to rely  heavily  on
formal,  school-based  VET  modes.
33.  Public  sector  wage and  tax  policies  that  contribute  to the
compression  of  wages  and  the  creation  of a  wedge  between  private  and  social
returns  to  vocationally-specific  skills  training  are  expected  to lead  to an
underinvestment  in skills  training  and  to greater  reliance  on formal  VET
delivery  modes.  In other  cases,  public  sector  employment  policies  that
promise  jobs  to graduates  of secondary  and  postsecondary  institutions  may
actually  contribute  to an overinvestment  in  secondary  and  postsecondary
education. These  distortions  of factor  market  prices  are  expected  to
impair  the  extern4l  and  possibly  the  internal  efficiency  of VET.  Where
such  distortions  are  found,  the  public  sector  is  more likely  to  be involved
in financing  occupational  skills  development  as  a  remedy  to  market  failures
21and  imperfections.  This  may b* reflected  in formal  medes  of  vwr and  in
public  subsidies  to  nonformal  modes  of training  in  the  enterprise.  The
comparison  of developing  countries  with different  levels  of  wage
compression  would  offer  a  means  for  testing  these  and  other  related
hypotheses.
The  Market  for  Capital
34.  As suggested  by Becker  (1975),  the  cost  of capital  is an important
element  in  the  willingness  of individuals  and  enterprises  to  pay for
vocationally-specific  skills  training. It is important  in terms  of its
impact  on the -'arginal  rate  of return  to investments  in  this  training.
Kodde  and  Ritze..  (1985),  using  Becker's  human  capital  framework,  show  that
imperfect  capital  markets  with rising  rates  of interest  on borrowing  will
lead  to  underinvestments  in  skills  development.  Competitive  capital
markets  with constant  borrowing  rates  are  required  for  efficiency  in skills
development. Experience  suggests,  however,  that  capital  markets  in  both
indusarialized  and  developing  countries  rarely  function  in an efficient
manner  where  individual  investments  in skills  are  concerned  because  of the
risk  attached  to the  return  from  these  investments  and  the  absence  of
security  for  such  loans. Experience  also  suggests  that  many enterprises  in
developing  countries,  particularly  smaller  ones,  face  an imperfect  capital
market  with implications  for  efficiency  in investments  in  physical  as  well
as human  capital  (Hanson  and  Neal,  1986,  pp 37-39).
35.  Becker  has shown  that  the  willingness  of individuals  and
enterprises  to  pay for  vocationally-specific  skills  training  depends  to an
important  degree  on the  division  between  general  and  specific  skills.
22Since  general  skills  increase  the individual's  productivity  equally  in  all
enterprises,  the  enterprise  is  unwilling  to  pay for  these  skills  for  fear
that  the  investment  will  be lost  through  labor  mobility. Individuals  are
therefore  expected  to pay  for  general  skills  training  while  the  enterprise
is  expected  to pay for  specific  skills  mwhose  marketability  is restricted  to
the enterprise.  Becker  acknowledges  that  most training  investments  are
neither  completely  general  nor  completely  specific. As a consequence,  the
cost  of such  training  will  be distributed  between  individuals  and
enterprises  in  proportion  to the  benefits  each  shares. Imperfect  capital
markets,  by distorting  the  cost  af training  for  individuals  and
enterprises,  are  expected  to lead  to inefficiencies  'n  the  human  capital
investmenits  of both groups. The  existence  of imperfect  capital  markets,
moreover,  provides  a  justification  for  the  public  irterest  in  VET.
36.  Distortions  in capital  markets  may also  arise  from  financial
policies  that  lead  to credit  rationing. Credit  rationing  can  shape  the
nature  of the  demand  for  occupational  skills  and  thereby  the  external
efficiency  of  VET institutions.  In  developing  countries,  these  policies
typically  favor  large  public  enterprises  and  can  lead  to socially
inefficient  choices  of technology  and  factor  combinations  in  production.
Branson  (1985)  describes  this  in  the  case  of  Portugal  where  the  absence  of
a  market  for  government  debt  requires  that  banks  fund  this  debt  at low
interest  rates  leading  to crowding  out  of  private  sector  borrowing. Adams
(1987)  in  a study  of the  Portuguese  textile  sector  refers  to capital
rationing  in  the  private  sector  and  its  opposing  effect  on the  ability  of
the  textile  sector  to restructure  itself  for  meeting  competition  in  world
markets. The  result  is found  in textile  workers  in  many enterprlses,
-3particularly  in the  wool subsector,  continuing  to  use outmoded  capital  and
methods  of production.
37.  Similar  distortions  in  capital  markets  may arise  as  part of a
stLategy  for  economic  development.  These  strategies  in  many industrialized
and  developing  countries  tend  to favor  capital  intensive  methods  of
production.  Tunisia  provides  an illustration  of this  with negative
implications  for  labor  absorption  (1987,  p.112). Capital  is subsidized  in
these  countries  through  schemes  involving  taxes,  administered  prices,  and
direct  subsidies  that  encourage  the  adoption  of methods  of production  that
may or  may not  be  consistent  with a  country's  existing  mix of occupational
skills  and its  resources  for  skills  training. This  can  have important
implications  for  the internal  and  external  efficiency  of vocationally-
specific  skills  training. By encouraging  capital  substitution  and  embodied
technological  change,  these  policies  can also  accelerate  the depreciation
of occupational  skills  and  reduce  expected  rates  of return  to  past
investments  in formal  and  nonformal  modes  of training. This  acceleration
is  expected  to encourage  larger  investments  in  general  education  and  more
flexible  modes  of skills  training.
38.  In  Burundi,  public  investment  has  concentrated  on capital-intensive
infrastructure  projects  (World  Bank,  1988,  pp. 24-25). Moreover,
incentives  in the  modern  sector,  where  tax  exemptions  have  been  offered  on
imported  capital  equipment  and interest  rates  and  energy  prices  have  been
kept  artificially  low,  have  also  encouraged  capital-intensive  development.
With this  emphasis,  modern  sector  employment  growth  has  failed  to keep  pace
with the  rate  of growth  of the labor  force. Between  1979  and 1985,
employment  growth  averaged  2.4  percent  per annum  compared  with labor  force
24growth  of 2.7  percent  per  annum.  Similar  evidence  of capital  biases  in
development  can  be found  in Indonesia  (World  Bank,  1985,  pp.  86-87). Until
1983,  Indonesia  subsidized  interest  rates. The  preferential  treatment  of
capital  was preserved  in a 1984  tax law  allowing  accelerated  cost recovery
for  capital  investments.  While  encouraging  capital-intensive  development,
Indonesia  is faced  with a labor  force  growing  at the  rate  of 2.3  percent
per annum  and  the  need  for  significant  labor  absorption  in  he commodity-
producing  sectors.
39.  Subsidized  public  sector  financing  of capital-intensive  development
in  the  Philippines  has  also  been  blamed  for  the  country's  low  rate  of
employment  growth  (World  Bank,  1987,  pp. i-iii). Other  examples  of capital
market  distortions  are  found  in  a  study  of seven  developing  countries,
including  Hong  Kong,  Pakistan,  Korea,  Ghana,  Sierra  Leone,  Tunisia,  and
Brazil. The  study  shows  that  when adjustments  are  made for  administrative
and  risk  differentials,  the  cost  of capital  for  small  non-agricultural
enterprises  is  as  much as 30 percent  higher  than  that  for  large-scale
enterprises  (Haggblade,  et.al.,  1986,  p.23). The  latter  tend  to  be  more
capital-intensive  than  the former. Capital  subsidies  are  seen  in  these
examples  as lowering  the rate  of labor  absorption  and  distorting  the  mix  of
skills  required. Factor  market  distortions  like  these  are  expected  to be
closely  connected  with distortions  in  product  markets,  given  the  nature  of
the derived  demand  for  capital  and  labor.
ECONOMIC  POLICIES  INVOLVING  PRODUCT  MARKETS
40.  Balassa  (1987,  pp. 1-3)  refers  to the  interaction  of  product  and
factor  markets. Inward  focused  trade  and  development  strategies,  he
25contends,  create  an environment  with less  resistance  to  measures  that
distort  flactor  prices  by insulating  the  domestic  product  markets  from
foreign  influences. In  turn,  factor  market  distortions  will tend  to
discourage  an outward  focused  trade  and  development  strategy  whose  success
depends  on the  unhindered  operation  of these  factor  markets. Evidence  of
this is  cited  in  Latin  American  and  Far  Easuern  countries. In several
Latin  American  countries,  inward  focused  strategies  have  been  accompanied
by distortions  in labor  and  capital  markets,  while  in  various  Far  Eastern
countries,  outward  orientation  has  been  associated  with free  labor  markets
and  the increased  freedom  of capital  markets  (Aizenman,  1t87,  p.2).
41.  This  relationship  implies  a correlation  between  trade  and  economic
development  policies  on the  one  hand  and  economic  forces  influencing  the
internal  and  external  efficiency  of  VET on the  other. Competitive  product
markets,  stimulated  by export-led  development  policies  and  an  open  economy,
will both require  and  encourage  competitive  factor  markets  that  will in
Lurn  be positively  correlated  with  the internal  and  external  efficiency  of
VET.  Korea,  Hong  Kong,  and  Singapore  provide  examples  of outward  focused
economies. In such  settings,  one  could  expect  to find  a larger  role  for
nonformal  modes  of training  because  competitive  labor  markets  would  be
associated  with less  wage compression  and  greater  incentives  for
vocationally-specific  skills  training  in the  enterprise  paid for  by reduced
wages.  Formal  modes,  however,  would  remain  an efficient  source  of training
for  some  occupational  skills,  as suggested  by Benson.
42.  Administered  commodity  prices  provide  an  example  of policy-induced
distortions  in  product  markets  affecting  VET.  Agricultural  pricing
policies  in  many developing  countries  discourage  the realization  of
26potential  benefits  to agricultural  education  and  training  by keeping  prices
artiticially  low  to reduce  the  cost  of food. This limits  the  economic
return  to investments  in agricultural  training  as  well as to research.
Moreover,  to the  extent  that  rural  non-farm  employment  is linked  to
agricultural  growth,  these  policies  may  also  impede  the  expansion  of non-
farm  employment  opportunities.  Product  market  distortions  created  by trade
and  economic  development  policies  on a national  level  may be joined  by
distortions  created  on the regional  level  by policies  adopted  to encourage
economic  growth  in disadvantaged  areas  of an economy. These  efforts  can
exacerbate  the  demand  for  skills  and  generate  acute  local  skills  shortages
which can  be costly  to  meet at the  local  level. This  is the  case  in
Tunisia,  for  example,  where  the  nature  of industrial  decentralization
incentives  favors  the  establishment  in outlying  areas  of large-scale,
capital-intensive  enterprises  (World  Bank,  1985).
43.  The development  strategies  of  other  countries  can  also  influence
the external  efficiency  of VET. Haddad,  Stevenson,  and  Adams  demonstrate
this in their  discussion  of youth  unemployment  in  Middle  Eastern  and  North
African  countries:
The  outlook  for  manpower  training  programs  has
changed  considerably  in  the  Middle  Eastern  and  North
African  countries  in recent  years. Unt'l  the late  1970's,
employment  in  the region  was virtually  guaranteed  for
anyone  with the  appropriate  skills,  and  unemployment  was
primar:.ly  a  problem  for  those  at the  lowest  end  of the
educational  spectrum. Since  then,  the  actual  and  projected
fall  in  oil  revenues  has led  to a dramatic  slowdown  in
migration  of labor  from  the  capital-poor,  labor-surplus
countries  to the  capital-rich,  oil-exporting  countries  of
the region. ... The  region  is  now facing  actual  and
potential  surpluses  of  both skilled  and  unskilled  manpower,
(1987,  i)
2744.  Social  and  private  returns  to investmonts  in  VET  by labor-exporting
countries  like  Jordan  and  Pakistan,  as a consequence,  have  been  sharply
altered  by global  events  involving  commodity  prices  outside  their  control.
Such  events  can  also  influence  investments  in  VET for  domestic  purposes.
Increasing  risk,  and  uncertainty  surrounding  such  investments  can alter  the
demand  for  training  positions  and  ultimately  the  external  efficiency  of
VET.  In  Tunisia,  for  example,  training  capacity  for  the  construction
industry  in  public  centers  was sharply  expanded  in  the  mid-1970's,  at the
heig  cv  *U  _j 1  __t_-  U-.  *; *;  ,  .
manpower  for  e*xport  to the  Gulf States  (World  Bank,  1985). This  export  did
not  materialize,  however,  due  to competition  from  other  suppliers,  and
partly  because  of the  subsequent  fall  in  oil  revenues. As a result,  the
utilization  rate  of the  expanded  training  capacity  was as low  as 50 percent
by the  early  1980's.
45.  Trade  and  development  as they relate  to choices  of technology  can
also  play  a role  in  shaping  the  efficiency  of VET.  Inappropriate
technology  choices  in  the  employment  system,  given  available  local
managerent  and  human  resources,  may result  from  conditions  established  by
foreign  suppliers  of  machinery  and  equipment. These  examples  illustrate
the  manner  in  which  the  resource  and  policy  parameters  given  the  training
and  employment  systems  can  shape  the  internal  and  external  efficiency  of
vocationally-specific  skills  training.
IV.  CONCLUDING  THOUGHTS  AND  A RESEARCH  AGENDA
46.  While  the  relationship  of education  and  training  to national
economic  development  and  individual  welfare  has  been  studied  extensively
28during  the  past  30  years,  much less  attention  has  been given  to the
endogenous  nature  of this  relationship  and  the  impact  of the  macroeconomic
environment  on efficiency  in the  production  and  consumption  of education
and  training. This  paper  has  examined  the  latter  relationship  and  the
importance  of policy-induced  market  distortions  to the  efficiency  of
resource  allocations  for  VET.  It  offers  evidence  of these  distortions  in
product  and  factor  markets  in  developing  countries  and  explores  their
consequences.  These  distortions  are  found  in  economic  policies  that  shape
tl,e  dema,d  for  goods  and  services,  relative  factor  prices,  and  technology
choices. Given  the  differences  to  be found  among  social  systems  in
developing  countries,  it is reasonable  to expect  that  the  mix and  relative
importance  of these  policy-induced  distortions  will vary  from  country  to
country.
47.  The lessons  that  can  be drawn  from  this  evidence  point  to the
importance  of recognizing  the  endogenous  nature  of this relationship  in
sector  analysis. There  are indeed  actions  that  can  be taken  within  the
education  sector  to improve  the  internal  and  external  efficiency  of formal
modes  of VET.  There  are  other  actions,  however,  whose  control  rests
outside  the  education  sector  in  the  macroeconomic  environment  that
establish  the  parameters  under  which  the  education  sector  must function.
It is important  tnat  these  parameters  be acknowledged  and  their  policy
antecedents,  as developed  in  this  paper,  be recognized  by economic  policy
makers  and  those  responsible  for  the  development  of effective  education  and
training  programs. To the  extent  the  former  can  be made  aware  of the
consequences  of economic  policies  for  human  resources  development  it  will
hopefully  lead  to a  more  sevsitive  development  of these  policies. To the
29extent  the  latter  understand  the  constraints  these  policies  provide  to
their  own  actions,  the  greater  the  opportunity  will  be for  adapting  to
these  constraints.
48.  Economic  policies  that  have  objectives  conflicting  with incentives
for  efficiency  in  education  and  training  will almost  certainly  continue  to
exist  as a part  of the  economic  landscape  in developing  and industrialized
countries. Schemes  for  the  redistribution  of income  linked  to social
equity  rather  than  efficiency  are  an illustration  of this.  In this
context,  analysts  must learn  to recognize  and  adjust  for  market  distortions
that result  from  these  policies. This  has  been illustrated  in the
discussion  of administered  wage policies  where  the link  between
productivity  and  earnings  has  been  severed  for  reasons  of social  equity.
In such  cases,  it  must be recognized  that  "first-best"  market  solutions  no
longer  apply  and  that  observed  prices  will be an inaccurate  indicator  of
social  opportunity  costs. As a  consequence,  in  this  example  the  use  of
rate  of return  analysis  with observed  wages  would  be inappropriate  for
efficient  resource  allocation. Instead,  shadow  wages  should  be used.
49.  A failure  to understand  the  relationship  between  the  macroeconomic
environment  and  the  training  system,  as  this relationRhip  relates  to
efficiency  in  the  production  and  consumption  of VET,  will  place  at risk
efforts  of the  education  sector  to improve  formal  modes  of  VET.  It is
important  for  this reason  that  research  be directed  to the  study  of this
relationship  and  its  outcomes. Among  the  issues  that  might  be studied,
four  appear  to be especially  important  to efforts  of the  education  sector
to improve  the  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of VET.  The four  include:  (i)
the  impact  of factor  pricing  policies  on technology  choices,  (ii)  the
30choice  of development  strategy  and  officiency  in  human  resources
development,  (iii)  the impact  of  policies  leading  to  wage compression  on
incentives  for  education  and  training,  and (iv)  the  manner  in  which
financing  schemes  can  influence  efficiency  incentives  in  VET.
Technology  Choices
50.  Economic  policies  that  distort  factor  prices  can  have  an important
impact  on technology  choices  and  skills  demand. Policies  that increase  the
relative  cost  of labor  and  decrease  the  rel:tiee  te^t  of  cpitsl tan
encourage  the  adoption  of technologies  that  place  pressure  on the
infrastructure  of human  resources  development. It  would  be useful  to
examine  the  nature  of  this  relationship  as  it relates  to the  demand  for
vocationally-specific  skills  training.  For  example,  to  what  extent  do
capital-biased  economic  policies  lead  to  technology  choices  that  expand  the
quantity  &nd level  of  skills  demanded,  either  in  the  use  of  these
technologies  or  in  their  production?  Furthermore,  what  impact  do  these
policies  have  on the  demand  for  basic  education  as  a  foundation  for
vocationally-specific  skills  development?  What  are  the  consequences  of
this  demand  for  developing  countries  with inadequate  resources  for  meeting
basic  education  needs?
51.  In  what fashion  do capital-biased  polices  and  technology  choices
influence  the  use  of existing  skills? Do these  policies  accelerate  the
depreciation  of these  skills  and  reduce  the  expected  income  stream  attached
to earlier  skills  investments?  How  do training  systems  in  developing
countries  adjust  to this?  Is  there  a tendency  to  move toward  more flexible
VET delivery  modes  in  the  enterprise?  Is  VET able  to adjust  and increase
31its  flexibility  through  improving  institutional  linkages  with the
employment  system? If so,  how is  this  done  and  what are  the  linkages  that
emerge? What role  do  capital-biased  policies  play in  the level  of
expatriate  employment  in developing  countries  and  their  ability  to
nationalize  this  employment?  What  are  the  consequences  of these  policies
in  terms  of labor  costs  and  Job  creation?
Development  Strategies
52.  A second  line  of research  suggested  by this  paper  involves  the
potential  connection  between  development  strategies  and  economic  policies
encouraging  efficiency  in  VET.  Outward  focused  development  strategies
place  emphasis  on competition  in  product  and  factor  markets  to encourage
efficiency  in  production,  while  inward  focused  strategies,  using
protectionist  measures,  shelter  inefficient  producers  and  contribute  to
market  distortions. Outward  focused  development  strategies  when
accompanied  by economic  policies  that  encourage  market  competition  might  be
expected  to reinforce  efforts  to improve  the  efficiency  of VET.  These
economic  policies  and  the  market  forces  associated  with  them  would
encourage  the  development  of cost-effective  approaches  to skills  training
to meet  market  needs.  Inward  focused  strategies,  on the  other  hand,  may
result  in economic  policies  that  shelter  and  promote  inefficiencies  in
skills  training.
53.  An examination  of this  issue  would  be important  to those  concerned
with  the  selection  of successful  development  strategies. It  suggests  a
jointly  dependent  relationship  whereby  outward  focused  development
strategies  would  create  a policy  environment  encouraging  efficiency  in
32skills  training. The  latter,  in  turn,  would  lead  to outcomes  supporting
the  success  of  the  former. The relationship  may not  be exactly
straightforward,  however,  as some  countries  may adopt  an outward  focused
development  strategy  in some  sectors  while  attempting  to  protect  others.
In  such  cases,  it  would  be useful  to  know  the  effect  this  has  on the
structure  and  efficiency  of the  training  system  serving  these  sectors. For
example,  is there  more  nonformal  training  in the  outward  focused  sectors  as
an indicator  of relative  efficiency?  Are formal  modes  of training  more
narrowly  defined  around  general  skills  in the  outward  focused  sectors?
54.  For  countries  with different  development  strategies,  it  would  be
useful  to know  the  connection  between  these  strategies  and  the  structure
and  efficiency  of VET.  Is there  evidence  of VET  being  more efficient  in
outward  focused  countries? How  tight  is  the linkage  between  these
strategies  and the  efficiency  of  VET?  Will  an outward  focused  strategy
create  sufficient  economic  pressures  to force  the  adoption  of economic
policies  encouraging  efficiency  in  VETY  Will  the absence  of these  policies
and  efficiency  in  VET effectively  impede  the  success  of an  outward  focused
development  strategy? Can  formal  modes  of  VET successfully  isolate
themselves  from  the  economic  pressures  of an outward  focused  development
strategy? Do they  behave  as a  profit  maximizing  entity,  or do  they instead
appear  to be  motivated  by other  bureaucratic  objectives? Is  there  a
difference  in  this regard  between  the response  of  public  and  private
institutions?
33Waxe  Compression
55.  Economic  policies  leading  to the  compression  of  wages  may reflect  a
conscious  tradeoff  of efficiency  for  equity  in factor  markets. It  would  be
useful  to know  more  about  this  tradeoff  insofar  as the  compression  of  wages
results  in inefficient  skills  training. To bekin,  do  wage rigidities  at
the  lower  end  of the  wage  structure,  associated  uth  minimum  wages,
collective  bargaining,  and  public  sector  wages,  discourage  general  skills
training  in  enterprises  by preventing  workers  from  paying  for  this  training
with reduced  wages?  Does  this  lead  to the  shifting  of general  skills
training  toward  formal  public  VET delivery  modes?  Do these  rigidities
encourage  the  substitution  of skilled  labor  for  unskilled  labor?
56.  How are  individual  incentives  to acquire  skills  training  affected
by economic  policies  that  lead  to  wage compression?  Ar. these  incentives
reduced  such  that  enrollment  rates  fall  and  VET facilities  are
underutilized  producing  internal  inefficiencies?  How does  this
underinvestment  in  general  skills  training  affect  specific  skills  training
in  the  enterprise? Does  the  complementarity  of general  and  specific  skills
training  force  enterprises  to absorb  the  cost  of general  skills  training?
Is  there  evidence  that  enterprises  are  willing  to pay  this  cost? How does
the  presence  of a  dual  economy  affect  these  incentives  where  an 'unlimited'
pool  of potential  VET students  exists  for  whom a compressed  wage is better
than rural  earnings  possibilities?
57.  In the  modern  sector,  how  do  progressive  tax  policies  influence
skills  training? Does  the  reduction  of after-tax  earnings  at the  upper  end
of the  wage structure  compress  earnings  and  discourage  skills  investments?
Do these  policies  encourage  the  shift  of employment  in  developing  countries
34to the informal  sector  where  these  taxos  might  be avoided? What effect
does  this  shift  have  on th-  demand  for  VET?  Is there  evidence  that  these
policies  lead  to skills  shortages,  higher  labor  costs,  and  the  possible
substitution  of capital  for  labor?
VET FinancinA
58.  Perhaps  one  of the  most important  issues  for  study  is  the  effect  of
policy-induced  market  distortions  on the  choico  of financing  schemes  for
VET and  the  effect  this  may  have  on VET's  efficiency. Financing  schemes
that  are  demand-driven  promise  to enhance  the  efficiency  of VET  by
improving  the institutional  linkages  between  the  training  and  employment
systems. The issue  is  whether  or not  policy-induced  market  distortions
reduce  the incentive  to adopt  these  schemes. Stated  simply,  do competitive
product  and factor  markets  stimulate  efficiency  in  VET by encouraging  the
adoption  of demand-driven  VET financing  schemes? If  not,  how  are  these
linkages  established?  Answers  to these  questions  and  others  above  are
Important  to a  better  understanding  of the  manner  in  which  economic
policies  can  act  to dampen  efforts  in  the  education  sector  to improve  the
cost-effectiveness  of  VET.
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